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On Resilience Analysis and Quantification for Wide-Area Control of
Power Systems
Yueyun Lu, Chin-Yao Chang, Wei Zhang, Laurentiu D. Marinovici and Antonio J. Conejo
Abstract— Wide-area control is an effective mean to reduce
inter-area oscillations of large power systems. Its dependence
on communication of remote measurement signals makes the
closed-loop system vulnerable to cyber attacks. This paper
develops a framework to analyze and quantify resilience of
a given wide-area controller under disruptive attacks on cer-
tain communication links. Resilience of a given controller is
measured in terms of closed-loop eigenvalues under the worst
possible attack strategy. The computation of such a resilience
index is challenging especially for large-scale power systems
due to the discrete nature of the attack strategies. To address
the challenge, we propose an optimization-based formulation
and a convex relaxation approach to facilitate the computation.
Conditions under which the relaxation is exact are derived
and an efficient algorithm with guaranteed convergence is
also developed. The proposed framework and the algorithm
allow us to quantify resilience for given wide-area controllers
and also provide sufficient conditions to guarantee closed-loop
stability under all possible communication attacks. Simulations
are performed on the IEEE 39-bus system to illustrate the
proposed resilience analysis and computation framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the power grid increasingly working close to its
operation limit, inter-area oscillation becomes ever more
lightly damped, which easily results in instability [1]. Local
decentralized controllers, such as power system stabilizers
(PSSs), are designed to suppress local oscillations. They may
interact in an adverse way, if not carefully tuned, that aggra-
vates inter-area oscillations. Motivated by the advancement
in the Wide-Area Measurement System (WAMS) technology,
recent research efforts have been focusing on wide-area
control (WAC) problems [2], [3], [4]. The goal of WAC
is to achieve better closed-loop performance, such as inter-
area oscillation damping, by the use of remote measurement
signals via the Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) installed
across the grid.
One important class of literature on WAC is concerned
with optimal control design under certain performance met-
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ric. The main control objective is inter-area oscillation
damping, for which various metrics have been proposed.
In the design of supplementary damping controller (SDC)
using Linear Parameter Varying (LPV) model [5], the met-
ric is given by the signal amplification from disturbance
to output. To design FACTS (Flexible AC Transmission
Systems)-based control facilitated by an aggregate model [6],
the metric is defined on the closed-loop transient response
of inter-area oscillation modes. A mixed H2/H∞ output
feedback control design is studied in [7] where the metric
is concerned with geometric measures of modal control-
lability/observability. Another control objective is voltage
stability. For the automatic scheduling and coordination of
voltage control devices [8], [9], [10], the metric is composed
of several terms regarding switching cost, penalty on voltage
violations and penalty on circular VAR flow. Typically, the
controllers are designed for a fixed structure, that is to say,
the communication network has a pre-specified structure.
There has been a recent interest in incorporating communi-
cation structure into the design. Due to the fact that most
optimal control formulations result in controllers without
any sparsity pattern and require centralized implementation,
a sparsity-promoting optimal control scheme is proposed
in [11] where the ℓ1 regularization term in the objective
accounts for the structural design.
Another body of literature is concerned with delays and
failures arising in the communication network of WAMS.
To deal with network delays, a predictor-based H∞ control
design strategy is discussed in [4] to account for a de-
layed arrival of feedback signals. Furthermore, an arbitration
approach is proposed in [12] to exploit the flexibility of
communication network so that the designed controllers are
in sync with network delays, making the closed-loop system
delay-aware, rather than just delay-tolerant. To counteract the
impact of communication failures on the closed-loop system,
a framework proposed in [13] utilizes a hierarchical set of
wide-area measurements for feedback and employs channel
switching based on mathematical morphology identification.
Existing works on WAC resilience mostly focus on com-
munication delays or failures. There has been limited discus-
sion on resilience under adversaries. Due to the increasing
threat on cyber security [14], [15], remote signal transmission
via communication channels is prone to cyber attacks. As
WAC relies heavily on the availability of remote signals,
the integrity of communication network plays a crucial role
in the closed-loop performance. In this paper, we consider
the adversary has disruptive resources [15] that can result in
unavailability of the signals transmitted over communication
channels. Such an attack model is commonly referred to
as Denial of Service (DoS) attack [16]. To launch a DoS
attack, the adversary can jam the communication channels,
compromise devices and prevent them from sending data,
attack the routing protocols, flood network traffic, among
others. Our goal is to develop a framework to analyze and
quantify resilience under DoS attacks. In particular, we aim
to design effective ways to determine whether a given wide-
area controller is resilient, and how resilient it is under cer-
tain attack strategy. To achieve this, we use network-reduced
linearized power system model under linear feedback control.
Such a model is widely used in the literature on WAC
problems [5], [10], [6], [17], [7]. We first define resilience in
terms of closed-loop spectral abscissa (the largest real part
of eigenvalues) under the worst possible attack strategy. The
direct computation of such a resilience metric is challenging,
especially in large-scale network due to its combinatorial
nature. We then propose an equivalent optimization-based
formulation and a convex relaxation approach to facilitate
the computation. On the theoretic side, we derive a condition
under which the relaxation is exact. On the practical side, we
develop an efficient algorithm for the relaxed problem with
guaranteed convergence. The algorithm not only provides
resilience criterion but also reveals structural vulnerabilities.
These results contribute new perspectives to WAC with an
emphasis on resilience under DoS communication attacks.
They also allow us to systematically analyze resilience
properties of a given wide-area controller.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we consider a network-reduced power system
model commonly used in the literature [18], [12], [5], [10],
[6], [17], [7]. The overall power system is represented by
an interconnected dynamical system defined on a graph G =
(N , E), where N , {1, · · · , N} denotes the set of buses
and E denotes the set of transmissions lines between buses.
Let xi(t) ∈ Rni be the state variables associated with bus
i. Depending on the level of details used in the generator
model, xi can represent generator phase angle, frequency,
quadrature-axis internal emf, state variables of Power System
Stabilizer (PSS) or other local controllers. Typically, local
dynamics and local controllers can be described by linear
systems subject to nonlinear coupling terms due to power
exchange with neighboring buses. The overall system can be
written is the following form:
x˙i = Aiixi + ci +
∑
(i,j)∈E,j 6=i
h(xi, xj),
where Aii ∈ Rni×ni is the system matrix that has in-
corporated local controls, ci is a constant term regarding
mechanical power input and h(xi, xj) is a nonlinear function
representing the power flow between buses i and j. By
linearization at a stationary operating point, we arrive at a
distributed control system of the following form:
x˙i = Aiixi +
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
Aijxj +Biui, i ∈ N , (1)
where with slight abuse of notation, xi represents the de-
viation of state variables from the nominal operating point,
Aij captures the linearized coupling between buses i and
j (Aij = 0 if there is no coupling), and Biui is an
introduced wide-area control action that reacts to deviations
from the nominal operating point based on both local and
remote state information. We consider wide-area control ui
to be composed of local component ui,loc that depends on
local state information and wide-area component ui,wac that
depends on remote state information in the following form:
ui = ui,loc + ui,wac = Kiixi +
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
Kijxj , (2)
where Kij ∈ Rmi×nj , i, j ∈ N are feedback gains. The
local component ui,loc is an additional correction on top of
local controllers, which can be set to zero if there is no such
correction. Note that the sparsity pattern of feedback gains
captures the structure of communication network. Define n ,∑N
i=1 ni,m ,
∑N
i=1mi. Let x = [x
T
1 , · · · , x
T
N ]
T ∈ Rn
and u = [uT1 , · · · , uTN ]T ∈ Rm. The overall system can be
described by
x˙(t) = (A+BK)x(t), (3)
where A = [Aij ]1≤i,j≤N ∈ Rn×n, B = diag{Bj}1≤j≤N ∈
R
n×m,K = [Kij ]1≤i,j≤N ∈ Rm×n are in block form.
Wide-area control is prone to cyber attacks due to its
dependence on remote measurement signals that can be
compromised by a malicious adversary. In this paper, we
consider DoS attacks [16] that can result in unavailability
of the signals transmitted over the attacked channels. We
describe an attack strategy by α ∈ {0, 1}N×N where entry
αij = 1 means the channel from subsystem j to i is intact
whereas αij = 0 means it is under attack. By assumption,
αii = 1, ∀i ∈ N . The set of all possible attack strategies
is called (pure) attack space and is defined as A0 , {α ∈
{0, 1}N×N : αii = 1, i ∈ N}. The consequence of DoS
attack is modeled by infinite delay of feedback signals.
We assume that an attack strategy α impacts the wide-area
control in the following way:
ui = Kiixi +
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
αijKijxj .
This corresponds to the case where the controller will ignore
the component Kijxj if the measurement signal of xj does
not arrive within a certain time period. Such a reaction
scheme is natural and commonly used in the literature [12].
Now we can write the post-attack closed-loop system under
attack strategy α ∈ A0 as
x˙ = (A+BK ◦ α)x, (4)
where K ◦ α , [Kijαij ]1≤i,j≤N denotes the elementwise
multiplication between entries of α (scalar) and subblocks
of K (matrix). Define A(α) , A + BK ◦ α. To write the
elementwise multiplication ◦ as a matrix multiplication, we
consider the following transformation:
K˜ = diag{K˜[j]}1≤j≤N ∈ R
n×nN , where
K˜[j] =
[
Kj1 Kj2 · · · KjN
]
nj×n
,
α˜ =
[
α˜[1] α˜[2] · · · α˜[N ]
]T
∈ RnN×n, where
α˜[k] = diag{αkjInj}1≤j≤N ∈ R
n×n.
Then, K ◦ α = K˜α˜. Furthermore, α˜ can be written as
the linear combination of a collection of constant matrices
{Mij ∈ RNn×n : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N} with entries of α as linear
coefficients, i.e.,
α˜ =
∑
1≤i,j≤N
αijMij , where
Mij(p, q) =


1, if p− q = (i− 1)n+
∑j−1
k=1 nk,
and q ∈ {1, 2, · · · , nj}
0, otherwise
.
Now, the closed-loop system matrix A(α) can be written in
the following form that is affine in entries of α.
A(α) , A+BK ◦ α = A+
∑
1≤i,j≤N
BK˜Mijαij . (5)
We consider a wide-area controller to be resilient if
it can survive all possible (pure) attack strategies on the
communication channel.
Definition 1. A controller K is called resilient if system (4)
is stable for all α ∈ A0. Conversely, it is called not resilient
if there exists an α ∈ A0 under which system (4) is unstable.
In what follows, we will analyze and quantify the re-
silience notion given in Definition 1. The first problem to
address is under what condition the resilience of a given
controller is guaranteed. We aim to derive conditions in terms
of optimization problems whose structure can facilitate the
analysis. A further problem is concerned with the degree
of resilience. We want to define a resilience index as a
normalized factor to quantify how resilient a given con-
troller is to certain attack strategies. For the practical aspect,
the goal is to develop an efficient algorithm to check the
proposed resilience conditions as well as identify structural
vulnerabilities.
III. A MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
WAC makes use of state information from remote buses to
improve the closed-loop performance under local decentral-
ized controllers. One may naturally think that a loss of part
of remote measurement signals will only gracefully degrade
closed-loop performance without causing instabilities. How-
ever, such an intuition is unfortunately not true in general. In
fact, a wide-area controller can become destabilizing under
a loss of a small subset of communication links. We now
use a simple hypothetical example to illustrate this fact.
Consider a networked system in the form (3) with N =
3 subsystems and each of which has two states and two
control inputs. For simplicity, we assume there is no physical
coupling among the three subsystems. Assume that A11 =
A22 =
1
2E2, A33 = E1, B1 = B2 = B2 = I2, 2K11 =
−K13 = K21 = −
1
2K23 = −K31 = K33 = E1, K12 =
2K22 = K32 = E2, where
E1 =
[
−3 −1
12 2
]
and E2 =
[
−3 1
−12 2
]
.
Let Ac and Ad be the closed-loop system matrices under
controller K and its full distributed realization, respectively.
Ac , (A+BK) =


E1 E2 −E1
E1 E2 −2E1
−E1 E2 2E1

 ,
Ad , A+BK ◦ I6 =


E1 0 0
0 E2 0
0 0 2E1

 .
It is easy to check that both Ac and Ad are stable. Now con-
sider the attack strategy α that targets at the communication
channel from subsystem 3 to 2, i.e. α23 = 0. The post-attack
closed-loop system matrix is
Aa , A+BK ◦ α =


E1 E2 −E1
E1 E2 0
−E1 E2 2E1

 .
As Aa has eigenvalues 5.1596, 0.6968,−0.8631,−1.3561±
6.5185i,−6.2811, two of which are on the right half of
the plane, the system is no longer stable. We can see
that controller K is vulnerable under the attack on the
communication channel 3→ 2.
IV. RESILIENCE ANALYSIS AND QUANTIFICATION
In this section, we develop a Lyapunov-based framework
to analyze and quantify resilience under DoS communication
attacks as formulated in Section II.
A. Resilience Conditions
A system is stable if and only if all its eigenvalues have
negative real part, and conversely it is unstable if and only
if at least one of its eigenvalues has positive real part. Given
a square matrix, we call the maximum among the real part
of its eigenvalues the spectral abscissa. One direct approach
for resilience condition is to first seek for the attack strategy
that results in the largest spectral abscissa of closed-loop
system matrix and then determine the sign of the largest
spectral abscissa. For the case where it is negative, the system
remains stable under all attack strategies; while for the case
where it is positive, there exists at least one attack strategy
that drives the system unstable. The direct formulation of
resilience condition takes the following form:
P0 γ∗0 , max
α∈A0
Re(λmax(A(α)))
If γ∗0 < 0, then wide-area controller K can survive all
possible attacks on the communication channels, otherwise it
inherits structural vulnerabilities. The optimization problem
P0 exhibits several main challenges: i) It is an unsymmetric
eigenvalue problem for which the spectral theorem does not
apply and thus λmax does not have an explicit expression.
ii) The objective is essentially nonconvex due to the max-
imization of the largest real part of eigenvalues. Typically,
eigenvalue optimization problems are formulated as the min-
imization of the largest eigenvalue or the maximization of the
smallest eigenvalue, both of which are convex. However, this
is not the case for P0. iii) The decision variable is binary
and not continuous, making the problem combinatorial in
nature. To address the above challenges, we next reformulate
the problem via Lyapunov stability theory.
1) A Lyapunov Formulation: Recall that the post-attack
system (4) is stable if and only if it admits a quadratic
Lyapunov function V (x) = xTPx for some P  0. The
condition can be written in the form of SDP: There exists a
P0  0 such that
A(α)TP0 + P0A(α) ≺ 0. (6)
Conversely, the post-attack system (4) is unstable if and only
if for all P  0, we can find a unit directional vector
xP ∈ {z : ‖z‖ = 1}, where the subscript emphasizes the
dependence of the vector on P , such that
xTP (A(α)
TP + PA(α))xP ≥ 0. (7)
Inspired by the above Lyapunov characterization, we con-
sider the following formulation:
Lya0 γ∗L0 , max
α∈A0
min
P0
λmax(A(α)
TP + PA(α))
Theorem 1 (Sufficient and Necessary Condition). A con-
troller K is resilient if and only if γ∗L0 = −∞, and is not
resilient if and only if γ∗L0 ≥ 0.
Proof. We partition the pure attack space into two disjoint
sets, i.e. A0 = As0 ⊔ Au0 , where As0 is the set of stabilizing
attack strategies and Au0 is the set of destabilizing attack
strategies. Let αs ∈ As0. Then, system (4) under αs is stable,
that is to say there exists P (αs)  0 dependent on αs such
that A(αs)TP (αs) + P (αs)A(αs) ≺ 0. Then,
min
P0
λmax(A(α
s)TP + PA(αs)) ≤
λmax(A(α
s)T cP (αs) + cP (αs)A(αs))→ −∞ as c→∞.
Let αu ∈ Au0 . Then, system (4) under αu is not asymptoti-
cally stable, which implies that for all P  0, there exists a
unit directional vector xP ∈ {z : ‖z‖ = 1} dependent on P
such that xTP (A(αu)TP + PA(αu))xP ≥ 0. Then,
λmax(A(α
u)TP + PA(αu))
= max
‖x‖=1
xT (A(αu)TP + PA(αu))x
≥xTP (A(α
u)TP + PA(αu))xP ≥ 0, ∀P  0.
Thus, minP0 λmax(A(αu)TP + PA(αu)) ≥ 0.
Now, we want to show the statement for the “resilient”
part. (⇒): Assume K is resilient. By Definition 1, all the
attack strategies are stabilizing, i.e. A0 = As0. Thus,
γ∗L0 = max
α∈As
0
min
P0
λmax(A(α)
TP + PA(α))
= max
α∈As
0
−∞ = −∞.
(⇐): On the other hand, if γ∗L0 = −∞, then for all α ∈ A0,
minP0 λmax(A(α)
TP+PA(α)) = −∞, i.e. α ∈ As0. Now
A0 = As0 and thus K is resilient.
Next, we want to show the statement for the “not resilient”
part. (⇒): Assume K is not resilient. By Definition 1, Au0 6=
∅. Let αu ∈ Au0 be a destabilizing attack strategy. Then,
γ∗L0 = max
α∈A0
min
P0
λmax(A(α)
TP + PA(α))
≥min
P0
λmax(A(α
u)TP + PA(αu)) ≥ 0.
(⇐): On the other hand, if γ∗L0 ≥ 0, then there exists an
αu ∈ A0 such that minP0 λmax(A(αu)TP+PA(αu)) ≥ 0.
In other words, there exists a destabilizing attack strategy and
thus K is not resilient.
2) A Lyapunov Relaxation: The optimal value of Lya0
provides an equivalent characterization of resilience as
proved in Theorem 1. However, the development of efficient
algorithm for Lya0 is highly nontrivial due to its binary
decision variables and unbounded optimal value. For the
practical use, we now consider a relaxation of Lya0 by
embedding the binary variables into closed interval [0, 1] and
upper bounding the largest eigenvalue of positive semidef-
inite (P.S.D.) variable. Let A , {α ∈ [0, 1]N×N : αii =
1, i = 1, · · · , N} and P , {P ∈ Sn : 0  P  λP I} for
some fixed λP > 0.
LyaP γ∗LP , max
α∈A
min
P∈P
λmax(A(α)
TP + PA(α))
By relaxing the feasible set for the min and constraining the
one for the max, LyaP provides a surrogate certificate to
Lya0, which leads to a sufficient condition for resilience.
Theorem 2. A controller K is resilient if γ∗LP < 0.
Conversely, it is not resilient only if γ∗LP ≥ 0.
Proof. Since P ⊂ {P  0} and minimization over smaller
set gives larger optimal value,
g(α) ,min
P∈P
λmax(A(α)
TP + PA(α))
≥min
P0
λmax(A(α)
TP + PA(α)) , g0(α).
Furthermore,A ⊃ A0 and maximization over larger set gives
larger optimal value,
γ∗LP = max
α∈A
g(α) ≥ max
α∈A0
g(α) ≥ max
α∈A0
g0(α) = γ
∗
L0. (8)
For the “if” part, assume γ∗LP < 0. By relation (8), γ∗L0 < 0.
It then follows from Theorem 1 that K is resilient. For the
“only if” part, assume K is not resilient. By Theorem 1,
γ∗L0 ≥ 0. Then, γ∗LP ≥ 0 by relation (8).
Recall that for a symmetric matrix M ∈ S, the largest
eigenvalue of M can be written as λmax(M) = min{t :
M  tI}. Since the inner problem of LyaP is the min-
imization of the largest eigenvalue, it can be equivalently
formulated in the form of SDP program. Let g : A → R
be the optimal value of the inner minimization (over P ) of
LyaP defined as
g(α) , min
P∈P
λmax(A(α)
TP + PA(α)). (9)
Then for any fixed α ∈ A, g(α) is the optimal value of the
following SDP:
g(α) = min t
s. t. A(α)TP + PA(α)  tI
P ∈ P
(10)
Consider the following optimization problem.
LyaD γ∗LD , min
α∈A
t
s. t. A(α)TP + PA(α)  tI
P ∈ P
Note that the first constraint in LyaD is a Bilinear Matrix
Inequality (BMI) in decision variables P, α and t. Next, we
will show that the dual problem LyaD is equivalent to the
primal problem LyaP.
Theorem 3. γ∗LD = γ∗LP .
Proof. Let α∗P be the optima of LyaP. Then, γ∗LP = g(α∗P ),
for which there exists P ∗P ∈ P such that A(α∗P )TP ∗P +
P ∗PA(α
∗
P )  γ
∗
LP I . For the “≤” part, it follows from the
triple (α∗P , P ∗P , γ∗LP ) being a feasible solution of LyaD.
For the “≥” part, consider the BMI constraint of LyaD.
For α∗P ∈ A, there exists P ∈ P such that A(α∗P )TP +
PA(α∗P )  γ
∗
LDI . By the equivalent characterization of g(α)
given in SDP (10), g(α∗P ) ≤ γ∗LD and thus γ∗LD ≥ γ∗LP .
To take one step further, a natural question to ask is
when the relaxed problem LyaP is “exact” in terms of
resilience. In other words, whether there are cases for which
solving LyaP results in sufficient and necessary condition.
The answer is yes under some assumption. We first define
Lyapunov space Pα ⊆ P for each pure attack strategy
α ∈ A0 as
Pα , {P ∈ P : A(α)
TP + PA(α)  0, P 6= 0}. (11)
To ensure the exactness of the relaxed problem LyaP, we
require the intersection of Lyapunov spaces of any two pure
attack strategies to be nonempty.
Assumption 1. For any α1, α2 ∈ A0, Pα1 ∩ Pα2 6= ∅.
The above assumption ensures the sign preserving prop-
erty of the function g defined in (9) in the sense that if g is
strictly negative on the vertex set A0, it is strictly negative
on the convex hull of A0, i.e. the relaxed attack space A.
On the other hand, if g fails to be strictly negative on A, it
fails to be strictly negative on A0.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, if g(α) < 0, ∀α ∈ A0, then
g(α) < 0, ∀α ∈ A; and conversely, if ∃α ∈ A s.t. g(α) ≥ 0,
then ∃α0 ∈ A0 s.t. g(α0) ≥ 0.
Proof. Since A is a polytope with vertex set A0, it is enough
to show the claim that for any α1, α2 ∈ A0, θ ∈ [0, 1], there
exists κ1, κ2 > 0 such that
g(θα1 + (1− θ)α2) ≤ κ1g(α1) + κ2g(α2).
Assume that the claim holds. Consider αθ ∈ A where αθ =∑
αk∈A0
θkαk for some θk ∈ [0, 1],
∑
k θk = 1. If g(αk) <
0, ∀αk ∈ A0, then g(αθ) < 0. On the other hand, if g(αθ) ≥
0, then g(αk) ≥ 0 for some αk ∈ A0. Now we are left to
show the claim.
For the ease of notation, let f(α, P ) , λmax(A(α)TP +
PA(α)) in the rest of the proof. Let α1, α2 ∈ A0, θ ∈
[0, 1], Pk = argminP∈P f(αk, P ), k = 1, 2. Consider αθ =
θα1 +(1− θ)α2. Recall that A(α) defined in (5) is affine in
α. Then, A(αθ) = θA(α1)+(1−θ)A(α2). By the convexity
of λmax(·) : Sn → R,
f(αθ, P ) ≤ θf(α1, P ) + (1 − θ)f(α2, P ) , hθ(P ).
By assumption, Pα1 ∩ Pα2 6= ∅. Let P0 ∈ Pα1 ∩ Pα2 .
Since the Lyapunov space (11) is defined by Linear Matrix
Inequality (LMI), the sets Pαk , k = 1, 2 are convex and
so is their intersection Pα1 ∩ Pα2 . Then, ∃t1 ∈ (0, 1) s.t.
P ′1 = t1P1 + (1 − t1)P0 ∈ Pα2 . Similarly, ∃t2 ∈ (0, 1)
s.t. P ′2 = t2P2 + (1 − t2)P0 ∈ Pα1 . As P0 ∈ Pα1 , we
have f(α1, P0) ≤ 0. By the convexity of f(α, P ) in P for
any fixed α, f(α1, P ′1) ≤ t1f(α1, P1)+(1− t1)f(α1, P0) ≤
t1f(α1, P1). Similarly, f(α2, P ′2) ≤ t2f(α2, P2). Notice that
the function hθ : P → R parameterized by θ ∈ [0, 1] is
the sum of two convex functions and thus is also convex.
Consider P = βP ′1 + (1− β)P ′2 for some β ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
hθ(P ) ≤ θβf(α1, P
′
1) + θ(1− β)f(α1, P
′
2)+
(1− θ)βf(α2, P
′
1) + (1− θ)(1 − β)f(α2, P
′
2).
Since P ′1 ∈ Pα2 , P ′2 ∈ Pα1 by construction, f(α1, P ′2) ≤
0 and f(α2, P ′1) ≤ 0. We prove the claim that g(αθ) ≤
κ1g(α1) + κ2g(α2) where κ1 = θβt1 and κ2 = (1− θ)(1−
β)t2.
With Lemma 1, it is easy to obtain the following sufficient
and necessary condition.
Theorem 4 (Sufficient and Necessary Condition II). Under
Assumption 1, a controller K is resilient if and only if γ∗LP <
0, and it is not resilient if and only if γ∗LP ≥ 0.
B. Resilience Index
The conditions derived in Section IV-A allow us to de-
termine whether a given wide-area controller is resilient to
all possible attack strategies. A natural additional question is
how resilient the controller is to certain attack strategies. This
calls for a proper definition of a normalized index to quantify
the degree of resilience. Denoted by rK : A0 → [0, 1] the
resilience index of controller K on the pure attack space.
We consider rK to be normalized with respect to the nominal
condition. In particular, rK needs to satisfy the following two
conditions: i) It takes value 1 under the nominal condition
when K is intact, i.e. rK(1N×N ) = 1; ii) It takes value 0
under destabilizing attack strategies, i.e. rk(α) = 0 for all
α ∈ A0 under which system (4) is unstable.
Recall that g : A → R defined in (9) is the optimal
value of the inner minimization (over P ) of the relaxed
problem LyaP. In fact, the mapping g defines a performance
metric for stability in the sense that for any α ∈ A, g(α)
is the fastest decreasing rate a Lyapunov function candidate
could achieve along the trajectory of A(α). This naturally
leads to a definition of resilience index satisfying the above
two conditions. Guaranteed by the design objective, the
system under the nominal condition has better stability
performance than the one under attack. Since the nominal
condition corresponds to α = 1N×N , we have i) g(1N×N) ≤
g(α), ∀α ∈ A0. On the other hand, we know from the
proof of Theorem 1 that ii) g(α) ≥ 0 for any destabilizing
α ∈ A0. Based on i) and ii), we define resilience index
rK : A0 → [0, 1] of controller K on the pure attack space
A0 as follows.
rK(α) =
{
0 if g(α) ≥ 0
g(α)/g(1N×N ) if g(α) < 0
(12)
The definition in (12) captures stability degradation of con-
troller K under different attack strategies. It is easy to
see that the smaller the index rK(α) is, the less resilient
controller K is to attack strategy α, or in other words, the
more disruption α will incur on K . For the two boundary
cases, if rK(α) = 0, controller K can be destabilized by α,
while if rK(α) = 1, α has no effect on controller K .
V. A PATH-FOLLOWING PRIMAL-DUAL ALGORITHM
The goal of this section is to solve the relaxed problem
LyaP. Notice that LyaP takes scalar continuous decision
variables αij , i 6= j and P.S.D. matrix variable P . By the def-
inition of g given in (9), LyaP is actually the maximization
of g on the polytopeA. A natural attempt is to apply gradient
ascent algorithm. The key step of gradient-based algorithm
is to compute the subgradient of the objective, that is ∂g for
the case here. Let fα(x, P ) , xT (A(α)TP + PA(α))x.
g(α) = min
P∈P
max
‖x‖=1
fα(x, P ). (13)
Notice that i) x 7→ fα(x, P ) is concave and continuous for
each P and ii) P 7→ fα(x, P ) is convex (actually affine) for
each x. By the general minimax theorem, the min and the
max in (13) can be swapped, i.e.,
g(α) = max
‖x‖=1
min
P∈P
fα(x, P ) = max
‖x‖=1
gx(α), where
gx(α) , min
P∈P
xT (A(α)TP + PA(α))x
Observe that g is the pointwise supremum of gx and gx(α)
is convex in α (actually affine) for each x. By the weak
rule for pointwise supremum, a subgradient of g at α is any
element in ∂gx∗(α)(α) where x∗(α) = argmax‖x‖=1 gx(α).
Now, let’s focus on computing the subgradient of gx∗ . Let
P ∗(α) = argminP∈P λmax(A(α)
TP + PA(α)), which
depends only on α, not on x. Let X∗ = x∗x∗T . Then,
gx∗(α) = 2 trace(P
∗A(α)X∗)
= 2 trace(X∗P ∗(A+
∑
1≤i,j≤N
BK˜Mijαij)).
Since gx∗ is affine in α, the subgradient of gx∗ coincides
with the gradient taking the following form:
∂ijgx∗(α) = ∇ijgx∗(α) = 2 trace(X
∗P ∗BK˜Mij).
We are now ready to introduce the primal-dual gradient
ascent algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Primal-dual gradient ascent algorithm
1: Inputs:
System matrices: A,B,K
2: Initialize:
αk−1 ← 1
N×N
, step size s, tolerance ǫ,
γk = −∞, γk−1 = 0
3: while γk < 0 or γk − γk−1 > ǫ do
4: Pk ← optimality of LyaD with α = αk−1 ⊲
Update dual variable P : SDP with LMI constraints
5: xk ← eigenvector associated with the largest eigen-
value of A(αk−1)TPk + PkA(αk−1), Xk ← xkxTk
6: ηij ← trace(XkPkBK˜Mij), η ← η/‖η‖F ⊲
Compute gradient ∇g(αk−1)
7: αk ← αk−1 + sη ⊲ Update primal variable α:
gradient ascent
8: αk ← ΠA(αk) ⊲ Project αk onto relaxed attack set
9: γk−1 ← γk, γk ← xTk (A(αk)
TPk + PkA(αk))xk ⊲
Compute objective
10: αk−1 ← αk
11: end while
12: Outputs:
optimality γk, αk
Let {γk}k∈N be the sequence of optimal value and
{αk}k∈N be the sequence of optima returned by Algorithm 1.
Theorem 5. A controller K is resilient if γk ↑ γ∗ < 0.
Conversely, it is not resilient only if γk ↑ 0.
Proof. Given αk−1, Pk is the optima of LyaD for α = αk−1
s.t. Pk = P ∗(αk−1), where
P ∗(α) = argmin
P∈P
λmax(A(α)
TP + PA(α)).
Now given αk−1 and Pk, xk is the eigenvector associated
with the largest eigenvalue of A(αk−1)TPk + PkA(αk−1).
xk = argmax
‖x‖=1
xT (A(αk−1)
TPk + PkA(αk−1))x.
To evaluate the subgradient of g, we define a collection of
functions gx : A → R parameterized by x ∈ {z : ‖z‖ = 1}.
gx(α;P
∗(α)) , xT (A(α)TP ∗(α) + P ∗(α)A(α))x.
Observe that g(·) is the pointwise maximum of gx(·; ·) where
the second variable is determined by the first variable and
is uniform in x. By the weak rule for pointwise supremum,
a subgradient of g at α is any element in ∂gx∗(α) where
x∗ is such that g(α) = gx∗(α). For α = αk−1, we have
g(αk−1) = gxk(αk−1;Pk) and thus
∂g(αk−1) ∋ ∂gxk(αk−1;Pk).
Due to gx(·; ·) is affine in the first variable, ∂gx = ∇gx. Let
η = ∇gxk(αk−1;Pk) ∈ R
N×N
. Then, η ∈ ∂g(αk−1). By
the property of subgradient, for s > 0 small enough,
g(αk) = g(αk−1 + sη) ≥ g(αk−1) + s〈η,ΠTA(αk−1)(η)〉,
where TA(α) denotes the tangent cone of A at α and
ΠM(·) denotes the projection operator onto M. For α ∈
int(A), ΠTA(α)(η) = η, ∀η ∈ R
n
. For α ∈ ∂(A), 0 ≤
〈η,ΠTA(αk−1)(η)〉 < ‖η‖
2
. Thus,
γk = g(αk) ≥ g(αk−1) = γk−1, ∀k ∈ N.
Now that the sequence {γk}k∈N is increasing and upper
bounded by 0, the rest of the proof follows from Theo-
rem 2.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate the proposed resilience frame-
work on the IEEE 39-bus system [19]. To obtain the lin-
earized model of the form (3), an object-oriented version of
PST has been used [20]. There are N = 10 buses in the
network-reduced model where bus 1 represents subtransient
salient pole with n1 = 7 states, bus 2-9 represent subtransient
round rotor with ni = 8 states for i = 2, · · · , 9 and bus 10
represents subtransient round rotor with n10 = 4 states. Each
bus from 1 to 9 has a scalar wide-area control input, i.e.
mi = 1, i = 1, · · · , 9 and bus 10 has no control, i.e. m10 =
0. The overall system has n = 75 states and m = 9 control
inputs. The dimension of system matrices are summarized
are follows: A ∈ R75×75, B ∈ R75×9,K ∈ R9×75.
We consider two wide-area controllers K1,K2 ∈ R9×75
that are relatively centralized as compared with the sparse-
promoting controller Ksp given in [11]. The spectral abscis-
sas (maximal real part of eigenvalues) of closed-loop system
under the three controllers are summarized in Table I. We
can see that K1,K2 have better closed loop performance
than Ksp since the former two leverage more remote state
information than the latter. However, the better closed-loop
performance comes at the price of exposing vulnerabilities
to cyber attacks. Next, we will analyze the resilience of
K1,K2 under attacks on the communication channels using
the proposed framework.
We first give an overview on the resilience of the two
controllers. In particular, we enumerate all possible single-
and double-channel attack strategies and summarize the
worst attack strategy of each scenario in Table II. We can
see that K1 is resilient to all the 81 single-channel attack
strategies, among which the worst attack 10→2 still results
in negative spectral abscissa -0.1744. On the other hand,
K2 is not resilient to single-channel attack and there are 2
out of 81 single-channel attack strategies that can destabilize
the system. Furthermore, neither K1 nor K2 is resilient to
double-channel attack. But K1 is relatively more resilient
than K2 as K1 has much less destabilizing double-channel
attack strategies (total of 4) than K2 (total of 167). Overall,
K1 is more resilient than K2. In what follows, we quantify
and analyze the resilience under cyber attacks of the two
controllers by first computing their resilience indices and
then identifying critical channels based on the machinery
we developed in this paper.
TABLE I
SPECTRAL ABSCISSA OF CLOSED-LOOP SYSTEM
w/o feedback w/ K1 w/ K2 w/ Ksp
maxi Re(λi) -4.9523e-06 -0.19184 -0.19195 -5.8433e-02
TABLE II
SINGLE- AND DOUBLE-CHANNEL ATTACK
total # of destab. worst attack max spec. abs.
1-ch 2-ch 1-ch 2-ch 1-ch 2-ch
K1 0/81 4/3240 10 → 2
5 → 4
6 → 4
-0.1744 0.1268
K2 2/81 167/3240 5 → 4
4 → 1
5 → 4
0.1484 0.6332
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Fig. 1. resilience index under single- and double-channel attack
A. Resilience Index
We compute resilience indices of the two controllers under
single- and double-channel attack using the definition given
in (12) and present them in Fig. 1. The worst three single-
channel attack strategies, corresponding to the smallest three
resilience indices, are highlighted by red dots. We can
see that resilience index of K1 is larger than that of K2,
suggesting K1 is more resilient than K2, as what is expected.
This shows that our resilience index is an effective metric to
quantify resilience.
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Fig. 2. left: convergence of Algorithm 1, right: spectral abscissa under
k-channel attack
B. Identification of Critical Channels
We apply Algorithm 1 to check the resilience criterion
for the two controllers. The sequences of optimal value are
plotted in the left panel of Fig. 2. We can see that γk ↑ 0
in both cases. By Theorem 5, we know that K1 and K2
both satisfy the necessary condition for non-resilience. To
identify critical channels, we focus on the optimal relaxed
strategy α∗ obtained at the instance k∗ when the optimal
value firstly reaches 0. We rank the criticality of channels
by the magnitude of their corresponding entry of α∗, that is
the smaller α∗ij is, the more critical channel j → i is. We
consider k-channel attacks for k = 1, · · · , 8 generated by
the criticality ranking and plot the resulting spectral abscissa
on the right panel of Fig. 2. The k-th most critical channel
is labeled on top of the red circle corresponding to k-
channel attack, whose attack set includes the first k most
critical channels. We can see that the system is driven more
and more unstable under the sequence of critical k-channel
attack strategy. Therefore, we successfully identify structural
vulnerabilities by the criticality ranking.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a novel framework for resilience
analysis and quantification of wide-area control of power
systems. We formally define the notion of resilience in the
presence of cyber attacks. Resilience conditions are given
in terms of Lyapunov-based optimization problems. A re-
silience index is defined to quantify the degree of resilience.
We develop an efficient numerical algorithm to check the
proposed resilience criterion as well as identify structural
vulnerabilities.
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